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Death by Bullying:  
A Comparative Culpability 
Proposal 
 
Audrey Rogers* 
 
On-line connectedness through social media sites on the 
internet has exacerbated all aspects of adolescent angst, from 
feelings of isolation, lack of popularity, complicated social 
hierarchies, exclusion, teasing, and bullying.  Proposals to 
address cyber-bullying typically suggest school-based solutions 
such as workshops, sensitivity training and codes of conduct.1  
In some instances, cyber-bullying has led to civil actions such 
as defamation, and infliction of emotional harm, mostly 
without success.2  A less frequent avenue is the criminal law to 
stop the bullying.  When used, the typical charges are for 
criminal harassment or stalking.3  In one highly-publicized 
case, federal prosecutors unsuccessfully employed a computer 
hacking statute to prosecute Lori Drew who created a fictitious 
on-line persona to bully thirteen-year old, Megan Meier, after 
the state found no grounds to prosecute her.4  Megan hanged 
herself upon being told by her bully that “the world would be a 
 
* Audrey Rogers, 2014.  My thanks to my colleagues at Pace Law School for 
their comments and suggestions, and to research assistant Jenna Beirlein. 
1. See, e.g., Naomi Harlin Goodno, How Public Schools Can 
Constitutionally Halt Cyberbullying: A Model Cyberbullying Policy That 
Considers First Amendment, Due Process, and Fourth Amendment 
Challenges, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641 (2011); Lawrence M. Paska, 
Cyberbullying from Classroom to Courtroom: Contemporary Approaches to 
Protecting Children in a Digital Age, 22 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 535 (2012). 
2. See, e.g., Finkel v. Dauber, 906 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Sup. Ct. 2010)  
(summary judgment granted to defendant). 
3. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-183 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 
9A.46.110 (2014). See generally Shira Auerback, Note, Screening Out 
Cyberbullies: Remedies for Victims on the Internet Playground, 30 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1641 (2009). 
4. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 451 (C.D. Cal. 2009).  See 
generally Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1569 (2010). 
1
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better place without you.”5  Finding that its harassment statute 
did not cover the incident, the state found no grounds to 
prosecute Drew.6 
The extreme consequence of bullying manifested in the 
Drew case - suicide - is occurring with alarming regularity.7  
There is a growing popular sense, as exemplified by the coining 
of the term “bullycide,” that cyber-bullying is a mounting 
problem that is not responding to other curbing measures, such 
as school conduct codes, civil actions, or more minor criminal 
sanctions.8  This article explores the possibility and 
advisability of imposing homicide charges against bullies, a 
controversial approach because of the serious causation 
questions it poses.  Nonetheless, there is precedent for holding 
a person criminally culpable for a victim’s suicide.  A notorious 
case involved the head of the Ku Klux Klan who was convicted 
of murder after the woman he raped killed herself by 
swallowing poison, “distracted by pain and shame so inflicted 
upon her.”9  Some may see her shame as analogous to gay teens 
who commit suicide after being bullied about their sexual 
orientation.  But perhaps the law should not demand that free 
will be completely lacking before a person is charged for 
another’s suicide.  In other instances such as provocation, the 
criminal law recognizes that the relationship between victim 
and defendant shapes culpability.  This article explores 
whether it is feasible and desirable to do so with suicides. 
Part I provides background on cyber-bullying with a focus 
on two highly-publicized cases.  Causation rules and their 
application in suicide-by-victim cases are laid out in Part II.  
Part III assesses whether homicides charges would be possible 
 
5. See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452. 
6. See Christopher Maag, A Hoax Turned Fatal Draws Anger but No 
Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/us/28hoax.html. 
7. David Badash, Yet ANOTHER Teen Suicide This Week: Anti-Gay 
Bullying Blamed, NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (Jan. 21, 2011), 
http://thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/yet-another-teen-suicide-this-week-
anti-gay-bullying-blamed/news/2011/01/21/16889. 
8. Apparently coined by journalist Neil Marr and anti-bulling expert 
Tim Field in their book on bullying in England. See NEIL MARR & TIM FIELD, 
BULLYCIDE: DEATH AT PLAYTIME (2001). 
9. Stephenson v. State, 179 N.E. 633, 635 (Ind. 1932). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/12
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against a bully.  It suggests the all-or-nothing approach to 
causation, and its exceptions are based on artificial and 
outmoded reasoning.  For example, using the Stephenson 
reasoning, a prosecutor would have to paint a bullying victim 
as mentally unstable and irresponsible.  For victims of bullying 
who are considering suicide, these prosecutions reinforce their 
sense of hopelessness and helplessness because they blame the 
bully for the victims’ suicidal acts.  The goal, instead, should be 
to empower bullying victims to seek other avenues to escape 
their bullies, to feel that they have choices; and that suicide is 
not an option. The bully should be punished, but the focus 
should be on his actions, not on the victim’s response.  Using a 
comparative causation analysis, as some scholars propose, we 
look to a person’s role in another’s death and punish according 
to the amount he contributed to the death.  Factors such as the 
imbalance of power between the bully and his victim, and the 
nature and severity of the bullying should be considered in 
determining whether a person who has a role in another’s 
suicide should be punished. 
 
I.  Background 
 
A. Traditional Bullying 
 
There is no universally accepted definition of bullying, but 
a number of states recently have passed school-based anti-
bullying legislation, with different definitions of bullying.  For 
example, one jurisdiction states bullying consists of 
“systematically and chronically inflicting physical hurt or 
psychological distress on one or more students and may 
involve: (1) Teasing; (2) Social exclusion; (3) Threat; (4) 
Intimidation; (5) Stalking; (6) Physical violence; (7) Theft; (8) 
Sexual, religious, or racial harassment; (9) Public humiliation; 
or (10) Destruction of property.”10  Other states are less 
detailed, defining bullying as follows: “any intentional written, 
verbal, electronic, or physical act” that a student has exhibited 
toward another particular student more than once” that causes 
mental or physical harm, and “is sufficiently severe, persistent, 
 
10. FLA. STAT. § 1006.147(3) (2010). 
3
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or pervasive that it creates an intimidating, threatening, or 
abusive educational environment for the other student.11 
 The lack of a standard definition of bullying is 
problematic as it difficult to assess the scope of the problem,12 
but some studies report that as much as 85% of children 
between the ages of 12 and 15 reported being teased or bullied 
at school.13  This article defines bullying as “physical or verbal 
abuse repeated over time, and involving a power imbalance.”14 
The victims of bullying can become depressed, anxious, 
have increased feelings of sadness and loneliness, and loss of 
enjoyment, health complaints, poor school performance, and 
are more likely to drop out of school.15  Workplace bullying is 
also common with up to 35% of employees reporting that they 
have been bullied.16  Similar to school bullying, the victims of 
workplace bullying can suffer emotionally and physically.  In 
addition, it can harm their careers; victims have high rates of 
absenteeism and reduced productivity.17  As described below, in 
extreme cases, a bully can be charged with causing their victim 
to commit suicide. 
 
B. Cyber-Bullying 
 
Although bullying has been present among teens for 
centuries, twenty-first century bullying often comes in a form 
that is termed “cyber-bullying.”  According to the National 
 
11. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.666 (West 2012). 
12. Emily Bazalon, Defining Bullying Down, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2013, 
at A23. 
13. Deborah Carpenter & Christopher J. Ferguson, What is Bullying?, 
NETPLACES, http://www.netplaces.com/dealing-with-bullies/what-is-
bullying/facts-and-statistics.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (discussing the 
2001 Kaiser Family Foundation study). 
14. See Bazalon, supra note 12. 
15. Effects of Bullying, STOPBULLYING.GOV, 
http://www.stopbullying.gov/at-risk/effects/index.html (last visited Dec. 18, 
2014). 
16. Gary Namie & Ruth Namie, Being Bullied? Start Here, WORKPLACE 
BULLYING INST., http://www.workplacebullying.org/individuals/problem/being-
bullied/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). 
17. Jerry Kennard, Workplace Bullying: The Signs and the Effects on 
Men, ABOUT.COM (Feb. 27, 2014), 
http://menshealth.about.com/cs/workhealth/a/work_bullying.htm. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/12
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Crime Prevention Council, cyber-bullying is a problem that 
affects almost half of American teens.18  Cyber-bullying is when 
someone repeatedly harasses, mistreats, or makes fun of 
another person online or with the use of a cell phone or other 
electronic device.19  Cyber-bullying can occur when a person 
pretends that he or she is someone else in order to trick 
someone else online, when someone spreads lies and rumors 
about another online, when someone sends or forwards mean 
text messages to another, and when someone posts pictures or 
videos of others online without their consent.20 
The Cyberbullying Research Center has done a number of 
studies to determine the prevalence, nature, and the 
consequences of cyber-bulling.  In the Center’s most recent 
research study, 4,441 youth between the ages of 10 and 18 were 
surveyed from 37 different schools.21  This study revealed that 
83% of the youth surveyed used a cell phone at least once a 
week and that a larger proportion of adolescents are now using 
Facebook as opposed to MySpace, Twitter, and other social 
networking sites.22  Out of those surveyed, 20% reported that 
they experienced cyber-bullying and that they were most 
frequently the target of mean or hurtful comments and 
rumors.23  Moreover, in 17% of the research sample, victims of 
cyber-bullying were re-victimized two or more times in a thirty-
day period.24  Female cyber-bullies were more likely to spread 
rumors, while male cyber-bullies were more likely to spread 
hurtful pictures or videos.25 
Unlike traditional bullying, cyber-bullying can be 
especially pervasive.  The evolution of technological 
 
18. See Cyberbullying, NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, 
http://www.ncpc.org/topics/cyberbullying (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). 
19. See Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Teens Use of Technology 
2010 February Research, CYBERBULLYING.Us, 
http://www.cyberbullying.us/research.php (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). 
20. See Cyberbullying, supra note 18. 
21. See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 19. 
22. See id. 
23. See Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying Research 
Summary: Cyberbullying and Suicide, CYBERBULLYING RES. CTR. (July 1, 
2010), http://cyberbullying.us/cyberbullying-research-summary-
cyberbullying-and-suicide/. 
24. Id.. 
25. See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 19. 
5
  
348 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  35:1 
communications allows bullies to embarrass their victims in 
front of enormous audiences and such communications can 
never be fully erased.26  Likewise, there is a growing concern 
for the consequences that both the victims and perpetrators of 
bullying endure.  Research has shown that cyber-bullying is 
linked to suicidal ideation.27  Both youth who are bullied and 
those who bully are at a greater risk for experiencing thoughts 
of suicide, attempting suicides, and successfully completing 
suicides.28  In fact, research shows that peer harassment 
contributes to depression and hopelessness, which lay the very 
foundation for suicide.29  While research shows that all forms of 
bullying are significantly associated with an increase of 
suicidal ideation, cyber-bullying victims were nearly twice as 
likely to have attempted suicide as those who had not 
experienced cyber-bullying.30 
 
 1.  Recent Cases 
 
This section focuses on two cases. First, where the cyber-
bully risks that his actions may lead to a suicide; and second 
where the cyber-bully actively encourages the victim to take 
her own life. 
 
a.  Case One - Tyler Clementi 
 
On September 29, 2010, the lifeless body of Tyler Clementi 
was found in the Hudson River.31  Just seven days prior, he 
posted his final words on his Facebook status, “Jumping off the 
 
26. See 21st Century Bullying, Crueler than Ever, NAT’L CRIME 
PREVENTION COUNCIL, 
http://www.ncpc.org/resources/files/pdf/bullying/21st%20Century%20Bullying
%20-%20Crueler%20Than%20Ever.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). 
27. See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 23. 
28. See id. 
29. See id. 
30. See id. 
31. See Kelly Ebbels, Tragic End for a True Talent, NORTHJERSEY.COM 
(Oct. 1, 2010), 
http://www.northjersey.com/news/104132029_Tragic_end_for_a_true_talent.h
tml. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/12
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gw bridge sorry.”32  Tyler committed suicide after being 
humiliated during the two days prior to his suicide.33  Tyler’s 
privacy was invaded when his roommate, Dharun Ravi, and 
Molly Wei, covertly set up a webcam after Tyler asked Mr. Ravi 
for some privacy on September 19, 2010.34  Mr. Ravi 
surreptitiously viewed Tyler engaging in intimate acts with 
another male, and shortly thereafter, posted on Twitter, 
“Roommate asked for the room till midnight.  I went into 
Molly’s room and turned on my webcam.  I saw him making out 
with a dude. Yay.”35  Not only did Mr. Ravi watch Tyler’s 
intimate encounter, but he also streamed the encounter on the 
Web for all of his friends to view.36  Two days later Mr. Ravi 
posted on Twitter, “I dare you to video chat me between the 
hours of 9:30 and 12.  Yes it’s happening again.”37  The 
following day, after Tyler learned what Mr. Ravi had done, 
Tyler killed himself.38 
The Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office initially charged 
Mr. Ravi and Ms. Wei with two counts of invasion of privacy for 
using “the camera to view and transmit a live image” of Tyler.39  
A grand jury subsequently handed down a 15-count indictment 
against Ravi for invasion of privacy, attempted invasion of 
privacy, bias intimidation, tampering with evidence, witness 
tampering, and hindering apprehension or prosecution.40  He 
 
32. See Alison Gendar, Edgar Sandoval & Larry McShane, Rutgers 
Freshman Kills Self After Classmates Use Hidden Camera to Watch His 
Sexual Activity: Sources, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 30, 2010, 12:06 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2010/09/29/2010-09-
29_rutgers_freshmen_busted_for_spying_on_fellow_students_online_sex_sess
ion_officia.html. 
33. See id. 
34. See id. 
35. Id. 
36. See id. 
37. Jessica Geen, US Teenager Kills Himself After Roommate ‘Taped 
Him Having Sex with a Man’, PINK NEWS (Sept. 30, 2010, 11:08 AM), 
http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2010/09/30/us-teenager-kills-himself-after-
roommate-taped-him-having-sex-with-a-man/. 
38. See id. 
39. See Lisa W. Foderaro, Private Moment Made Public, Then a Fatal 
Jump, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2010, at A1. 
40. See id.  Within a few weeks of Tyler Clementi’s death, three other 
young people took their own lives.  Seth Walsh, a thirteen-year-old, hanged 
himself after being cyber-bullied because of his sexual orientation.  See John 
7
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was ultimately convicted of all counts, and received a 30-day 
sentence.41 
 
b. Case Two - Megan Meier 
 
Thirteen-year-old Megan Meier hanged herself in her room 
after a boy she met online, Josh Evans, told her that “the world 
would be a better place without her.”42  Little did Megan know, 
Josh Evans never existed.43  Instead, 47 year old, Lori Drew, 
created a fake MySpace account and communicated with 
Megan as a cruel joke after Mrs. Drew’s daughter and Megan 
had a falling out.44  Drew, who knew Megan was on medication 
for depression, had the fictitious boy flirt with Megan and 
made Megan think he liked her.45  “He” then abruptly told her 
he no longer liked her. That day, Megan killed herself.  Finding 
that its harassment statute did not cover the incident, the state 
found no grounds to prosecute Drew.46  Federal prosecutors 
sought unsuccessfully to employ a computer hacking statute to 
punish Drew.47  Other than social opprobrium, which was 
widespread, Drew was not punished.48 
 
Schwartz, Bullying, Suicide, Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2010, at WK1.  
So did Asher Brown, a teen from Texas, who shot himself in the head.  See 
Richard James, US Gay Community Reeling from ‘Epidemic’ of Suicides 
Among Teenagers Taunted Over Sexuality, MAIL ONLINE (Oct. 1, 2010, 11:25 
AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1316782/US-gay-community-
reeling-epidemic-suicides-teenagers.html. Billy Lucas hanged himself at his 
grandmother’s house after being bullied because of his sexual orientation, as 
did fourteen-year-old, Kameron Jacobsen, who took his own life after being 
taunted on Facebook because of his sexual orientation.  Id. 
41. He was also sentenced to 300 hours of community service, three 
years’ probation, a $10,000 fine, and mandatory counseling.  Michael 
Koenigs, Candance Smith & Christina Ng, Rutgers Trial: Dharan Ravi 
Sentenced to 30 Days in Jail, ABC NEWS (May 21, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/rutgers-trial-dharun-ravi-sentenced-30-days-
jail/story?id=16394014.  The lenient sentence caused a national furor.  See 
Kate Zernike, Judge Defends Penalty in Rutgers Spying Case, Saying It Fits 
Crime, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2012, at A22. 
42. See Maag, supra note 6. 
43. See id. 
44. See id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 451 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
48. Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Overturns Conviction of Lori Drew in 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/12
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Whether homicide charges are appropriate for cyber-
bullies depends in large part on whether they have caused the 
victim to commit suicide.49  The next sub-section lays on 
general causation rules. 
 
II. Causation Rules and Cases 
 
The basic homicide doctrine requires that a defendant 
cause harm as a condition of culpability.50  Known as “result-
oriented” offenses, homicide statutes do not prohibit any 
particular conduct per se, only the result of the conduct.51  A 
person is culpable when he causes an unlawful death by any 
voluntary act52 accompanied by the appropriate mens rea.  In 
contrast, most offenses focus on prohibiting specific acts—
robbing, raping, carjacking, drunk driving.  One could say that 
homicide statutes are victim-oriented rather than defendant-
oriented in that they look at the result, not the act. 
It is with result-oriented crimes, the largest group of which 
is homicides that causation issues arise.53  Typically, it is when 
 
Cyberbullying Case, ABA J. (Aug. 31, 2009), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judge_overturns_conviction_of_lori_d
rew_in_cyberbullying_case/. 
49. Of course, the actor would also have to have the appropriate mens 
rea for a homicide charge. 
50. As I explained in an earlier work, result-oriented crimes are those 
where there is some conduct, stated either explicitly or implicitly, and a 
consequence of that conduct.  For example, robbery is defined as the forcible 
taking of the property of another.  Here, the defendant’s conduct is the 
“forcible taking.”  There is no result element.  The effect of a successful 
robbery is that the victim has less property, but robbery is not a “result- 
oriented” crime under the above definition.  There is no consequence separate 
and apart from the conduct, and thus, no “result” element to the offense.  
Compare robbery to murder.  A person is guilty of murder when he 
“intentionally causes the death of another human being.”  Here there is no 
explicitly stated conduct element –any act or omission will suffice. The result 
element is “causes the death.”  The death is a consequence of the actor’s 
conduct.  See generally Audrey Rogers, New Technology, Old Defenses: 
Internet Sting Operations and Attempt Liability, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 477, 485 
n.26 (2004). 
51. Id. 
52. The voluntary act could be by omission. 
53. Some scholars state that the actus reus of an offense contains a 
causation element in that social harm is caused by all crimes. See, e.g., 
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 180 (3d ed. 2001).  
9
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a victim’s death occurs in a manner different than intended or 
risked by the defendant.  For example, if a defendant intends to 
cause a person’s death by shooting her, and instead she dies of 
fright upon seeing his raised gun, a question arises as to 
whether he caused her death.  Similarly, if two men engage in 
a drag race and one of them swerves into an oncoming truck, a 
questions arises as to who caused the truck driver’s death. 
  The fundamental question posed when death occurs in 
an atypical fashion is stated well in the Model Penal Code, 
which asks whether the actual result is “not too remote or 
accidental in its occurrence as to have a just bearing on the 
actor’s liability.”54  The courts have developed a two-part 
analysis to answer this question.  The defendant’s conduct 
must be both the actual and legal cause of death.  To assess the 
actual cause prong, courts ask whether “but for” the 
defendant’s actions, would the death have occurred when it 
did.55  This step casts a wide net that eliminates only the most 
peripheral of actions.56  One could say, for example, that but for 
a defendant’s mother giving birth to him, he could not have 
killed the victim, and but for her mother’s birth of her, etc. 
Therefore, most causation analysis focuses on the second 
prong of legal causation to narrow down all those incidents that 
may have filled the “but-for” net.  One way to measure whether 
a defendant is the legal cause of death is to see if he is the 
proximate cause of death.  Thus proximity in and of itself is not 
the requirement, but just the tool.  This tool uses foreseeability 
as the main gauge of legal cause.  But even foreseeable results 
may not suffice as legal cause.  In certain instances, the link 
between the defendant’s actions and the harmful result is 
broken by intervening forces. 
The intervening force relevant to this article is the victim’s 
own actions that contribute to her death.  Even if foreseeable, 
such actions may break the causal chain.  Why is this the case?  
 
Professor Dressler acknowledges that the vast majority of causation problems 
occur in homicide offenses. 
54. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 (1985). 
55. See DRESSLER, supra note 53, at 184. 
56. Id. For example, if defendant gives victim poison that would cause 
death in one hour, but after five minutes, victim is struck by lightning that 
instantly kills him the defendant is not the but-for cause of death. Id. at 186-
87. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/12
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Two historical explanations exist: First, under English common 
law, suicide was a crime that resulted in post-mortem 
punishment in the form of forfeiture of land and non-religious 
burial.57  Most likely the latter punishment stemmed from the 
views of most religions that suicide was a grave sin, as it 
violated the commandment not to kill.58  The exceptions to 
punishment of the suicide actor were limited to instances 
where he was insane or compromised by pain or depression, 
rather than by “anger or ill will.”59  Thus, the early common 
law recognized a distinction between suicides committed with a 
diminished capacity versus those committed with free will.  
Even as the prevalence of suicide as a crime diminished, its 
underlying distinction remained as a basis for determining 
culpability of third persons to the suicide.  As discussed more 
fully below, the common-law distinction also applies as the 
basis of the related, but separate crime of assisting a suicide.60 
A second reason for the rule that a victim’s action breaks 
the causal chain is grounded in tort rules of contributory 
negligence.  The early common law of torts held that a 
plaintiff’s contributory negligence barred any tort recovery, 
mainly because it was thought impossible to properly apportion 
responsibility.  Most jurisdictions have rejected the harsh 
effects of a contributory negligence rule in favor of 
apportionment through comparative negligence principles; 
nevertheless, vestiges of the ban remain by analogy in the 
criminal law.61 
 
57. Sue Woolf Brenner, Note, Undue Influence in the Criminal Law: A 
Proposed Analysis of the Criminal Offense of “Causing Suicide”, 47 ALB. L. 
REV. 62, 64 (1982); Catherine D. Shaffer, Note, Criminal Liability for 
Assisting Suicide, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 348, 349 (1986). 
58. See generally G. Steven Neeley, The Right to Self-Directed Death: 
Reconsidering an Ancient Proscription, 36 CATH. LAWYER 111 (1995). 
59. See Brenner, supra note 57. 
60. See infra notes and accompanying text. 
61. The policy of the law in this respect is founded upon the 
inability of:  
 
human tribunals to mete out exact justice.  A perfect code 
would render each man responsible for the unmixed 
consequences of his own default; but the common law, in 
view of the impossibility of assigning all effects to their 
respective causes, refuses to interfere in those cases where 
negligence is the issue, at the instance of one whose hands 
11
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The following sub-section describes various scenarios that 
implicate the ability to freely choose to take one’s own life.  
Generally, when a victim seeks to escape imminent physical or 
mental injury inflicted by a defendant by committing suicide, 
the causal chain remains intact between the defendant’s act 
and the victim’s death.  
 
A. Infliction of Physical Injuries That Lead to Suicide 
 
It is well-settled that when a victim is assaulted by a 
defendant, the victim’s actions to take his or her own life are 
not a superseding cause that breaks the causal connection 
between the defendant’s actions and the victim’s death.  
Therefore, defendants can and have been charged with 
 
are not free from the stain of contributory fault . . . . 
 
CHARLES BEACH FISK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
12 (1885). 
 
It is said again, that the true theory upon which the rule 
rests is that the defendant is not the cause of the injury if 
the plaintiff's negligence contributes to it; but this is a very 
superficial view.  If it is meant that the defendant is not the 
sole cause, the argument only goes around in a circle, and if 
it is meant that the defendant is liable every time he is the 
sole cause of an injury, it is not true.  "The true ground," 
says Dr. Wharton, "for the doctrine is that, by the 
interposition of the plaintiff's independent will, the causal 
connection between the defendant's negligence and the 
injury is broken."  It is also sometimes assumed to rest upon 
the maxim volenti non fit injuria, but the objection to this 
position, as well as to Dr. Wharton's definition, is that 
negligence, in its very essence, negatives the idea of an 
exercise of the will.  A person whose negligence causes an 
injury cannot be spoken of with any accuracy of expression 
as "willing" it.  Negligence can only be conceived upon the 
hypothesis that the will, as to the particular condition, is 
inactive.  In my judgment no more satisfactory reason for 
the rule in question has been assigned than that which 
assumes it to have been founded upon considerations of 
public policy.  We need not seek for any better reason for a 
rule of law than that, among all the possible rules that 
might be adopted, it is plainly the best—that indeed it is the 
only rule upon the subject for an instant practicable. 
 
Id. at 12-13 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
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homicides, even though the victims cause their own immediate 
death by committing suicide.  The typical rationale is that the 
defendant’s actions rendered the victim irresponsible so that 
the suicide was not the product of free will.  For example, in 
People v. Lewis, 62 the defendant and the victim were brothers-
in-law who engaged in an altercation that resulted in the 
victim being shot in the abdomen.63  Although medical evidence 
established that the wound would have caused the victim’s 
death in about an hour, within a few minutes of being 
wounded, the victim took a knife and cut his own throat 
causing the victim to die five minutes later.  The Court was 
faced with the dilemma of whether the victim’s action of killing 
himself by slashing his throat, which was indeed the 
immediate cause of his death, should acquit the defendant of 
manslaughter.64 
The Court ruled that it must look to the time of death and 
determine if the wound inflicted by the defendant contributed 
to the victim’s death.65  It held that when the victim slashed his 
throat, the gunshot wound was contributing to the death, the 
defendant was properly convicted of manslaughter.66 
The same principle of culpability applies to cases where 
the victim refuses medical treatment for her wounds or pulls 
out intravenous tubes that are the immediate cause of death.  
The underlying rationale is that the defendant is responsible 
for destroying the victim’s desire to live.  For example, in 
People v. Macklin, the defendant shot the victim when the 
victim showed up at the defendant’s house with others to fulfill 
a debt that the defendant’s girlfriend owed the victim.67  The 
victim was shot in the neck and a tracheotomy and breathing 
tubes were inserted into the victim to enable the victim to 
 
62. 57 P. 470, 473 (Cal. 1899). 
63. See id. at 471. 
64. See id. at 471-72. 
65. See id. at 473. 
66. See id.  This principle is applied regardless of whether the wound 
inflicted upon the victim before the committed suicide is mortal or non-
mortal.  See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 182 F. Supp. 548, 549 (D.D.C. 
1960). 
67. See People v. Macklin, No. 190994, 1999 WL 33435973, at *1 (Mich. 
Ct. App. Sept. 7, 1999). 
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breathe.68  At some point the tubes were detached from the 
victim and he died as a result of the absence of the tubes.69  
The defense argued that the victim’s medical condition was 
stable, that he was recovering from the gunshot wound, and 
that he committed suicide, which, allegedly, was an 
intervening cause that broke the causal chain in his homicide 
charge.70  The court disagreed, holding that the victim’s suicide 
was a natural and probable complication of the gunshot wound 
that caused the need for intubation.71   
What is significant in the refusal of treatment or removal 
of life-saving devices cases is that the courts do not always rest 
their rulings on a finding that defendant rendered the victim 
irresponsible so that the suicide was not an act of free will.  To 
the contrary, some courts rely on a person’s right to freely and 
voluntarily choose to die as the rationale for finding that 
exercising this right does not relieve the defendant of causal 
responsibility.72  As explained by one court, the basis of 
defendant’s culpability is that he “forged a causative link 
between the initial injury and death and was a sufficiently 
direct and contributing event which eventually resulted in 
death.”73  What could break the causal chain is a sufficient 
length of time and recovery from defendant’s act and a 
suicide.74 
Why should it be that the choice to commit suicide that is 
freely and reasonably made does not break the causal chain? 
One explanation was offered in a leading treatise: 
 
[S]uicide is not abnormal when B acts out of 
extreme pain of wounds inflicted by A or when 
the wound has rendered him irresponsible.  
Although voluntary harm-doing usually suffices 
 
68. See id. 
69. See id. 
70. See id. at *2.  Defendant also argued that the cause of death could 
have been gross negligence committed by the nurse in removing the tubes. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. See, e.g., People v. Caldwell, 692 N.E.2d 448 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); 
People v. Velez, 602 N.Y.S.2d 758 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1993). 
73. Velez, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 762. 
74. Id. 
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to break the chain of legal cause, this should not 
be so when A causes B to commit suicide by 
creating a situation so cruel and revolting that 
death is preferred.75 
 
The key factors in finding that a suicide does not break the 
causal chain is the defendant’s commission of a violent crime 
that resulted in the victim’s physical pain and trauma, with the  
suicide occurring shortly thereafter; a finding of lack of free 
will is not essential. 
 
B. Infliction of Mental Injuries That Lead to Suicide 
 
Whether the foregoing rule applied to non-physical injuries 
was the focus of State v. Stephenson, a case famous both for its 
causation holding and its larger narrative in helping curtail the 
prominence of the KKK in the United States.  Because the 
infliction of mental anguish is at the heart of current cyber-
bullying suicide cases, a detailed discussion of the case follows. 
 
75. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4, at 365-66 (5th ed. 2010); see 
People v. Macklin, No. 190994, 1999 WL 33435973, *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 
7, 1999).  This article looks at suicide and whether the defendant has caused 
it, rather than the specific separate crime of aiding a suicide that is more 
commonly used when a person helps a terminally ill patient kill him or 
herself.  See generally Shaffer, supra note 57, at 348.  In the latter case, the 
person’s desire to die pre-dates any action by the defendant, and it is much 
more likely that courts will find that the victim’s actions alone are the cause 
of his demise.  Finding that a person who intentionally aids another to kill 
himself should be a crime, many jurisdictions enacted assisted suicide 
statutes that codified the distinction between providing the means to commit 
suicide and actively participating in the suicide by performing the physical 
act that causes death. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 401 (West 2014); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 11 § 645 (West 2014); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (McKinney 2014).  
The Kevorkian cases highlight this division. See People v. Kevorkian, 527 
N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1974).  Dr. Kevorkian, a prominent and zealous advocate 
of physician–assisted suicides, developed a “suicide machine” to assist 
terminally-ill individuals who wished to die.  He was indicted on two counts 
of murder after two women died using his machine with him at their sides, 
but with the women activating the machine.  The Supreme Court of Michigan 
ultimately ruled that Dr. Kevorkian could not be charged with their deaths 
because he did not participate in the “final overt act that causes death.” Id. at 
741.   It was only after Dr. Kevorkian personally injected lethal drugs into a 
patient that he was convicted of murder.  See Dirk Johnson, Kevorkian 
Sentenced to 10 to 25 years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, April 14, 1999, at A21. 
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The case arose in Indiana in 1925.  The Ku Klux Klan was 
at the height of its power in the United States, Indiana was its 
stronghold with over 250,000 members,76 and David Curtiss 
Stephenson was the Grand Dragon of its Ku Klux Klan.77  
Stephenson accumulated a great amount of wealth from the 
position and used his power and wealth to support political 
candidates.  By 1925 over half the members of the Indiana 
General Assembly, the Governor of Indiana, and many other 
high-ranking members of the government were all members of 
the Klan.78  As Stephenson bragged to people, “I am the law in 
Indiana.”79 
In 1924, Madge Oberholzer attended a dinner at the 
Governor’s mansion, where she met Stephenson, and he was 
instantly attracted to her.80  Madge went on two dates with 
him; on the second date, he revealed that he was the Grand 
Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan.  Incensed, she immediately broke 
off the relationship.  On March 27, 1925, Stephenson called 
her, and asked her to come to his home about a new, important 
job.81  When she arrived at his home, he overpowered her, 
forcing her to drink several glasses of alcohol until she became 
sick and nearly passed out.  Stephenson then had two of his 
bodyguards carry her into a car, where she fainted.  When she 
awoke, she was on Stephenson’s private train, on its way to 
Chicago.82  There he raped her several times, also mutilating 
her, until she blacked out.83  Madge thought to kill herself with 
Stephenson’s gun, but wanting to spare her mother disgrace, 
decided to poison herself, whereby death would occur more 
 
76. Ku Klux Klan in Indiana, IN.GOV, 
http://www.in.gov/library/2848.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). 
77. DAVID BODENHAMER & ROBERT G. BARROWS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
INDIANAPOLIS 1296-97 (1994). 
78. Indiana Klan, WIKIPEDIA (Oct. 9, 2014, 7:00 PM), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indiana_Klan. 
79. WILLIAM LUTHOLTZ, GRAND DRAGON: D.C. STEPHENSON AND THE KU 
KLUX KLAN 43, 89 (1993). 
80. Id. See also Karen Abbott, “Murder Wasn’t Very Pretty”: The Rise and 
Fall of D.C. Stephenson, SMITHSONIAN.COM (Aug. 30, 2012), 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/murder-wasnt-very-pretty-the-rise-
and-fall-of-dc-stephenson-18935042/?no-ist. 
81. Id. 
82. Stephenson v. State, 179 N.E. 633, 635 (Ind. 1932). 
83. Id. 
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slowly and to perhaps make it look less like a suicide.84 
Madge asked Stephenson to let her leave the hotel to 
purchase sundry items.  With one of Stephenson’s colleagues 
escorting her, she went to a drug store, where she bought 
poison, which she secretly took back at the hotel.  She died on 
April 14, 1925, after giving a dying declaration that recounted 
what had happened to her.  Medical experts laid the cause of 
death to a combination of the poison she took and the injuries 
Stephenson inflicted during the rape. 
Stephenson was arrested and charged with rape and 
murder.  At trial, he argued that it was Madge’s own act that 
caused her death.  The jury rejected this claim and found 
Stephenson guilty of killing her.  The finding was affirmed by 
the Supreme Court of Indiana, which undertook a detailed 
analysis of the causation issue, raised once again by 
Stephenson on appeal.  The court agreed that an independent, 
intervening cause will eliminate defendant’s acts as a 
proximate cause of death.  Nevertheless, the court noted well-
settled primary and secondary authority that established 
where a victim takes her own life because she has been 
physically attacked by the defendant, and is therefore 
“rendered irresponsible by the wound,” the defendant is 
responsible for causing her death.85  Similarly when a victim is 
trying to flee from further attack and exposes herself to harm, 
the causal link remains.86 
The significance of the Stephenson ruling is that the court 
stated that the injury that renders the victim irresponsible is 
not limited to physical wounds.  Thus, when Stephenson 
repeatedly attempted to rape her and inflicted both physical 
and mental wounds upon Madge that rendered her “distracted 
by pain and shame so inflicted upon her,”87 he was guilty of 
causing her death, notwithstanding her suicide.  Moreover, the 
court stressed that Stephenson was ever-present because of his 
cohorts (and, I believe, because of the power he held in 
Indiana,) Madge could feel that she had no viable alternative to 
 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 648-49. 
86. Id. (citing Rex v. Beech, [1912] 23 Cox Crim. Cas. 181 (Crim. App. 
1912), accord Rex v. Valade, [1915] 26 Can. Cr. Cas. 112 (Can. Que.)). 
87. Id. at 655. 
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escape continued sexual assault than by committing suicide.  
The court stated that her situation was no different than 
throwing oneself out of window to escape. It concluded that 
Stephenson, “rendered the deceased distracted and mentally 
irresponsible, and that such was the natural and probable 
consequence of such unlawful and criminal treatment.”88 
 Some early scholars have criticized Stephenson on the 
grounds that “shame and disgrace” rather than prevention of 
further harm was the reason for Madge’s suicide and that this 
was insufficient to hold Stephenson culpable.89  Their criticism 
rests on a reluctance to acknowledge that defendant’s acts 
could have rendered her irresponsible or that mental harm is a 
sufficiently natural and probable consequence of rape so as to 
lead to suicide.  Whether this is because of archaic notions of 
mental injury is unclear, but one can hazard a guess that at 
the time of the Stephenson case in 1932, there was considerable 
skepticism about mental impairments. 
We can sum up with the uncontroversial rule that when 
the defendant constrains the victim’s free will by inflicting 
great physical or mental pain, he has caused the victim to 
commit suicide and is therefore guilty of a homicide.90 
 
88. Id. at 649.  As a coda to the case, the outrage over his conduct toward 
Madge lead to the downfall of the KKK in Indiana and nationwide, so that 
from its height of popularity in 1924 when the KKK’s membership numbered 
6,000,000, it plunged to 30,000 by 1930—with most scholars in agreement 
that the Oberholzer case was the catalyst for Klan disenchantment.  The 
Various Shady Lives Of The Ku Klux Klan, 85 TIME 32, Apr. 9, 1965, 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?sid=c1f7385a-0077-4f00-b242-
eaac089e9e7f%40sessionmgr4003&vid=2&hid=4114&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWh
vc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#db=a9h&AN=54030426. 
89. Lester P. Schoene, et al., Homicide- responsibility for Victim’s 
Suicide Following Assault, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1261 (1932). 
90. In contrast to scenarios where the victim wants to die, the law 
recognizes instances where a victim’s actions will be charged back to a 
defendant even where the victim has free will.  The criteria are joint activity 
and a victim who risks, rather than seeks, death.  The classic example is the 
Russian roulette scenario. Here players who jointly agree to play a game that 
involves spinning a gun’s cylinder, then pointing the gun to one’s own head, 
and firing.  Should death occur, courts have held that the game participants 
are guilty of reckless homicide on the theory that the defendants’ 
participation and encouragement caused the victim’s death.  The free will of 
the victim in choosing to engage in the risky behavior does not break the 
causal chain when death is foreseeable.  See, e.g., State v. McFadden, 320 
N.W.2d 608 (Iowa 1982); Commonwealth v. Atencio, 189 N.E.2d 223 (Mass. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/12
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III. Comparative Liability 
 
As described above, traditional rules cut off a defendant’s 
responsibility for a person’s suicide unless he rendered the 
victim mentally irresponsible or otherwise compromised the 
victim’s free will, such as by inflicting serious physical or 
mental injuries.  At issue is whether the law should move from 
this “all-or-nothing” causation approach to one of comparative 
culpability. 
When the bullying victim intentionally kills himself, the 
current law relieves the bully of any responsibility in causing 
the suicide unless he rendered the victim irresponsible or 
inflicted serious physical injuries. Yet there is clearly some 
connection between the bully and bullied.  Professor Vera 
Bergelson advocates that the relationship between victim and 
perpetrator be formally recognized in the criminal law, rather 
than in merely these few isolated examples via a principle of 
“conditionality of rights.”91  She explains that, “Pursuant to 
this principle, the perpetrator’s liability should be reduced to 
the extent the victim, by his own acts, has diminished his right 
not to be harmed.”92  By that principle, a person may lose some 
rights due to his own actions. If that happens, the perpetrator 
may not be guilty of violating the rights that have been lost. 
Should Professor Bergelson’s conditionality of rights 
principle work in reverse to inculpate rather than to 
exculpate?93  In situations such as Stephenson that involve the 
involuntary reduction of rights, she acknowledges causation is 
“almost never an all-or-nothing issue,” 94  yet the criminal law 
traditionally has refused to acknowledge this fact.  She 
suggests that tort law approaches to comparative causation 
 
1963). But see Commonwealth v. Root, 170 A.2d 310 (Pa. 1961).  Since the 
victim only risks death in these cases, they are not squarely on point. 
91. Vera Bergelson, Victims and Perpetrators: An Argument for 
Comparative Liability in Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 385, 387 
(2005). 
92. Id. at 390. 
93. A special thanks to my former colleague, Professor Luis Chiesa for 
his help on this point. 
94. Bergelson, supra note 91, at 479. 
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may work well in the criminal law context.95 Helpful tort 
approaches include examining the relative responsibility of 
victim and perpetrator.96  Thus in the criminal law context, the 
questions a jury would need to answer are two-fold: (1) the 
difference  a particular act makes to an outcome and (2)  the 
legal and moral  weight we assign to different types of 
behavior. 
According to Professor Bergelson, comparative causation 
analysis best explains the Stephenson outcome.97  For the first 
question, the jurors would be likely to conclude that 
Stephenson’s actions were at least as important a cause of 
Madge Oberholtzer’s death as her own—but for him, she would 
not have taken the poison, or have been denied medical 
assistance.98  On the second question, Professor Bergelson 
suggests the defendant is the cause of death because, “the 
jurors would have to compare the legal and moral significance 
of cold-blooded, premeditated criminal acts committed by 
Stephenson and hysterical, semi-rational acts of Madge 
Oberholtzer committed in response to the attack she had 
suffered.”99  In her view, this is a better analysis of the result 
than the one employed by the Stephenson court that stretched 
to find guilt under traditional causation principles.100 
 
95. Id. at 453. 
96. Id. at 481.  She suggests other tort-based tests, such as 
counterfactual similarity, and the “necessary element of a sufficient set.”  Id. 
at 480.  Professor Simons is most critical of applying these two tests to 
criminal law analysis.  See Simons, infra note 102. 
97. See Bergelson, supra note 91, at 482. 
98. Id. at 483. 
99. Id. 
100. Id.  As further support for her conditionality of rights principle, 
Professor Bergelson examines scenarios where the victim has voluntarily 
reduced his rights, such as by drag-racing or playing Russian Roulettte.  
Courts have reached divergent results in these cases with some finding the 
defendants caused the victims’ deaths and others holding they have not.  Id. 
at 422.  She posits her comparative culpability formula supports inculpating 
defendants for the victim’s death.  She proposes that, “A more realistic and 
fair approach [than to completely absolve or blame defendants] would be to 
apportion responsibility among all parties who have contributed to the 
criminal outcome,” by punishing the survivors of risky games of a type of 
reckless endangerment offense.  Id. at 472.  She does not go so far as to say 
the defendants caused the victim’s death, but does propose that defendants 
have a connection to the victim’s actions and should be punished based on 
this connection. 
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Another scholar, Professor Kenneth Simons, is mostly 
critical of Professor Bergelson’s theory has applied it to 
defenses such as consent, self-defense and provocation.101  
Nevertheless, he agrees that Professor Bergelson’s concept of 
relative causal contribution “is indeed a coherent and plausible 
approach.”102  He further acknowledges that while the law 
“currently employs proximate cause criteria in an all-or-
nothing manner, but it would indeed be possible to employ such 
criteria flexibly, not dichotomously.”103 
Professor Bergelson supports a comparative approach as 
support for her position that a victim’s actions should be 
considered to mitigate a defendant’s culpability, rather than 
artificially ignoring the victim’s role in crimes.  My contention 
is that a conditionality of rights principles can work equally 
well to inculpate.  Accordingly, we should not treat victim 
suicide as automatically breaking the causal chain and 
defendant’s contribution to the harm.  Whether we use 
causation principles or create other crimes to punish a 
defendant’s part in causing the death of one who kills himself, 
what we are saying is that there is a connection between them 
that needs recognition. 
Applying Professor Bergelson’s test to the Clementi and 
Drew cases, we would ask first whether the bullies were the 
but-for cause of death.  For the first question, a jury is likely to 
conclude that Drew’s action of creating a false web persona 
that taunted the victim “w[as] at least as important a cause of 
Meghan Meier’s death as her own act of hanging herself.”104  
 
101. Kenneth W. Simons, The Relevance Of Victim Conduct In Tort And 
Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 541 (2005).  His position is that the 
conditionality of rights principle does not provide a singular, helpful theory 
by which to judge victim culpability; instead it merely gives different means 
of addressing consent, self-defense and provocation.  Id. at 562-63. 
102. Id. at 551-52. 
103. Id. at 552. 
104. Traditional but-for causation analysis does not require the 
defendant’s act be the sole cause of death; it is sufficient for it to be a 
“substantial factor” in the death.  See WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4(b), 
at 653-65 (5th ed. 2010).  Whether Meghan Meier had pre-existing emotional 
problems would not relieve the defendant of culpability as the law requires 
that one “takes the victim as she finds her.”  Id. § 6.4(f)(2), at 364.  Thus, if a 
defendant stabs a person who because of a blood-clotting disorder bleeds to 
death, the defendant is not relieved of responsibility for causing the victim’s 
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Similarly, Ravi’s act of secretly taping and tweeting about 
Tyler’s homosexual encounter was a substantial factor in the 
suicide. 
Under a comparative causation approach, the second prong 
assesses the “legal and moral weight we assign to different 
types of behavior.”105  Lori Drew, an adult repeatedly preyed on 
a young girl via fake web postings to perform a sick act of 
revenge for a supposed slight on her own daughter.  Drew is 
the epitome of a cyberbully because of the imbalance of power 
between her and Meghan, and the repeated acts of bullying.106  
A jury should have been asked to assess whether Drew’s acts 
was a cause of Meghan’s death; this would have been possible if 
the prosecution had pursed homicide charges against Drew 
rather than asserting that there were no state cyberbullying or 
harassment laws under which to charge Drew.107 
The Clementi case is less likely to result in finding Ravi 
culpable for homicide under a comparative causation analysis.  
At first blush, there are many similarities between the 
Clementi and Stephenson cases.  First, in both cases the victims 
suffered shame and humiliation- Clementi by his publicly 
outing as a homosexual, and Oberholtzer by being raped.  
Second, both could be said to be under their tormentors’ control 
with no means of escape.  Stephenson physically controlled his 
victim by kidnapping her and keeping her under the watch of 
his cronies and employees.  She knew he was the powerful head 
of the KKK who bragged about controlling the courts and law 
enforcement in his state.  Clementi was virtually controlled by 
Ravi because the pervasive nature of the internet made it 
impossible for him to escape. 
Despite these similarities, Stephenson’s violent beating, 
biting and raping of Oberholtzer is the decisive difference 
between the situations.  The weight a jury gave to these actions 
 
death.  Id.  Even if the defendant does not intend to inflict a deadly injury, 
courts have found them responsible, despite victim’s pre-existing condition, 
although the rule is less definitive.  Id. § 3.12(h), at 317. 
105. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 451 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
106. Id. 
107. The outrage over the Drew case led the Missouri legislature to pass 
a criminal harassment law.  See MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.090 (2012).  Critics 
have attacked the law as unconstitutionally vague.  One wonders why the 
prosecutors did not charge Drew with reckless child endangerment. 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/12
  
2014 DEATH BY BULLYING 365 
was a major factor in convicting him of Oberholtzer’s death by 
suicide.  What Ravi did to Clementi was less nefarious.  It most 
likely would appear to a jury as an extremely stupid, juvenile 
act that, under the conditionality of rights test, would not 
inculpate Ravi for Clementi’s death.108  In this scenario, a 
better result in measuring the interrelationship between the 
defendant and the victim is to say defendant deserves 
punishment, but not for a homicide.109 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Bullying and suicide are an ever-increasing problem in the 
Internet age.  Studies have shown that bullying victims have a 
higher suicide rate than their non-bullied contemporaries. 
Prosecutions that paint victims of bullying who have 
committed suicide as mentally unstable may reinforce the 
sense of hopelessness and helplessness others who are bullied 
feel. The goal should be to empower bullying victims to seek 
other avenues to escape their bullies, to feel that they have 
choices and that suicide is not a good option.  A comparative 
causation analysis would not treat the suicide as an automatic 
break in the causal chain or mark the victim as mentally 
unstable. Instead, it would look to a person’s role in another’s 
death; by inculpating the bully, we are saying that he deserves 
punishment because his actions had an effect on the suicide 
victim. 
For egregious bullying cases, prosecutors can and should 
consider possible homicide charges. Whether a jury will be able 
to properly assess the defendant’s role in a victim’s death 
requires us to reject victim suicide as either an automatic 
break in the causal chain or the product of mental 
irresponsibility. Instead, a jury should consider factors such as 
 
108. While Ravi and Clementi do not fit squarely within the definitions 
of bully and victim since there was not an obvious power imbalance between 
them, we could posit that a gay young adult is in powerless situation in a 
majoritarian heterosexual world.  However, to fit squarely within the 
Stephenson model, the prosecution would have to paint Clementi as mentally 
irresponsible, an undesirable option. 
109. See Foderaro, supra note 39 and accompanying text.  Ravi’s thirty-
day sentence provoked much public outrage as too lenient; appeals of the 
verdict and the sentence by the defense and prosecutions, respectively, are 
pending. 
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the imbalance of power between the bully and his victim, the 
nature and severity of the bullying, and whether avoidance is 
possible. 
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